
Qatar GP, McLaren: the real mistake was ignoring the 2023 precedent
In Formula 1 at the Qatar GP, McLaren repeated the same mistakes it had made since last season, losing crucial advantages that prevented victories or strong finishes. Last Sunday, the team made an error where previous feedback could have helped. It was a tactical scenario already seen in Lusail, which the world champion team failed to evaluate, unlike Red Bull and other teams. Let’s analyze how and why this happened.
The suicidal strategy of the Woking team
For everyone, especially those directly involved, it was clear that the British F1 team made a major strategic error at the Qatar GP. We have analyzed it thoroughly, examining the tactical choices from Red Bull’s perspective, which, despite taking a significant risk, executed the winning move that effectively shaped the race in favor of Max Verstappen.
Today, we can calmly review the facts from McLaren’s point of view. The first point is obvious, highlighted by Hannah Schmitz herself: prioritizing fairness between the two drivers never helped the British team during the year. Regarding Lusail, this approach was decisive in throwing away a double podium that could have effectively closed the fight for the still-undecided Drivers’ Championship.
McLaren admitted the fatal error, a mistake they realized immediately after making it. However, there is another factor to consider: failing to give the proper weight to the historical strategy of the Qatar race. Teams use different and very complex models to plan race strategies before the event, with scenarios ready to be activated as needed.
The final decision among the most promising tactical options falls to the head of strategy. When evaluating all competitive contexts, past editions must also be taken into account. This is something we considered, taking inspiration from Ruth Buscombe, former Alfa Romeo strategist. Looking back, the 2023 edition of Lusail revealed a similar situation.
The past McLaren ignored
In the 2023 Qatar GP, Pirelli had set a maximum stint length of 18 laps. With a total of 57 laps, completing three full stints meant covering only 54 laps, leaving three laps unaccounted for. At Alfa Romeo, Valtteri Bottas started ninth. In the very early laps, a Safety Car came out.
The strategists did not call Valtteri immediately but waited until the third lap. This allowed them to execute a pit stop while saving valuable track time. As a result, Valtteri gained positions and scored points. Drawing a parallel to Sunday’s race, considering the new 25-lap limit, the pit window opened on lap seven.
It is clear that opening the window this early during the race suddenly eliminates strategic flexibility. In other words, the following stints had to follow a precise plan dictated by the maximum laps allowed, and the pit stop timing became fixed and unchangeable. After Red Bull’s call, Verstappen had to stop on lap 32: there was no alternative.
The real McLaren mistake
The British team misjudged the possibility of losing the race lead, for example by underestimating the difficulty of rejoining the track in traffic after a pit stop. At that point, the pit wall tried to emulate strategies from other races, attempting to combine a very fast and solid final stint with Piastri. The goal was to recover all the “race time” lost.
However, with the advantage of a full pit stop gained by Max Verstappen, it was impossible for McLaren’s Australian driver to catch the Dutchman. The team did not adequately consider the actual scenario that occurred in Qatar in 2023. The example of Alfa Romeo and other teams was evident to everyone, precisely what Red Bull chose to do by timing the Safety Car stop perfectly.



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