The double disqualification of the McLaren cars in Las Vegas has once again turned the spotlight on ride heights and plank wear, especially given the limited amount of usable data gathered during free practice. The team from Woking was not the only one to struggle with bouncing during the race, because Williams encountered the same issue – but managed to avoid a penalty.
The exclusion of both McLaren cars during the Las Vegas Grand Prix weekend brought the topic of minimum ride heights and plank wear back to center stage. It served as a reminder of how teams constantly push their cars to the absolute limit, sometimes risking going beyond it. However, the MCL39s were not the only cars affected by the porpoising that appeared along the Strip.
Williams also had to deal with heavy bouncing on the straights and in the faster corners. Unlike McLaren, though, the Grove team succeeded in staying within the limits imposed by the regulations, thereby avoiding a disqualification that would have jeopardized the fifth-place finish secured by Carlos Sainz.
On the one hand, teams aim to run the cars as close to the track surface as possible, maximizing aerodynamic load and reducing drag – a crucial benefit on long straights such as those in Las Vegas. On the other hand, they must maintain enough margin to remain within the FIA’s parameters regarding skid block wear.
It is a delicate balancing act, further complicated in Las Vegas by the extremely limited data collected during free practice. Dirty asphalt and red flags in the first two sessions greatly reduced the chance of completing long runs, while the rain that fell before FP3 left the track wet for most of the session, adding even more difficulty for the teams.
These circumstances had an impact on two levels. In McLaren’s case, the team had not identified any concerning porpoising issues during free practice and assumed the problem would not reappear in the race. At the same time, the limited number of “real” laps completed in FP2 and FP3 meant the teams had almost no opportunity to compare actual plank wear to their simulation models.
Since there is no sensor capable of measuring skid wear in real time, teams must rely on estimates obtained by cross-referencing other car data, as well as on measurements taken after each session. At that point, the skid block is removed and measured with dedicated instruments to determine the real level of wear. That figure is then compared to simulations, helping engineers refine their projections and set the car up for qualifying and the race.
“What we are learning about how to extract performance from this car and from this technical cycle is the reason why we are improving in the last few races. Next year’s car will not work the same way aerodynamically, and we will not be so dependent on the floor from an aero point of view,” explained James Vowles during the team’s traditional post-race debrief, outlining what a team can learn when it faces unexpected scenarios such as the one encountered in Las Vegas.
“But one of the aspects that is very important for me and for Williams is that we begin every weekend by learning from our mistakes, because what we learn is the best proof of how we work, how we use the tyres, and how we set up the car.”
Like McLaren, Williams was also surprised to see such pronounced porpoising. The bouncing itself is easy to detect through sensors that track load values, ride heights, and accelerometer data. What is much more complicated is integrating porpoising into predictions of plank wear.
Without a dedicated sensor, that figure can only be estimated. At that point, many factors come into play, varying from car to car: the amount of downforce generated, the safety margin the team has decided to leave before the race, and the way the car reacts to the track conditions. In practice, the same bouncing phenomenon can have radically different effects.
McLaren detected the porpoising early, but it was only in the second half of the race that their estimates indicated a concrete risk of exceeding the FIA limit, forcing the team to adopt extreme saving techniques to try to contain the situation. It is also plausible that the team from Woking, usually among the best at managing ride heights, opted for a setup slightly more aggressive and softer than their rivals to fight for the win.
Vowles praised how the Williams crew handled the situation: once the porpoising appeared, the team made the necessary adjustments to remain within FIA limits, likely intervening on tyre pressures during the pit stop as well. This choice could also help explain why Carlos Sainz experienced greater difficulties in the second stint on the hard compound compared to the first phase of the race.
“One of the important aspects, for example, is how we responded to the same problem McLaren suffered in Las Vegas — the porpoising. We managed to react to it during the race, which means we were able to finish the Grand Prix in a condition of legality,” James Vowles said.
“Everything we learn on this front will also be useful for next year and for the seasons that follow. This is how we communicate and what the working culture at Williams is like. For us, the way we operate is extremely important. The other key aspect is how we use our simulations. This makes us stronger as a team and will continue to benefit us in the future.”
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